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Railroads play a critical role in the transportation and economic prosperity of North 
America. Train safety has improved considerably over the past decade. However, with the large 
volume of traffic, accidents still occur. Derailments are the most common type of train accident 
recorded in the Federal Railroad Administration’s Rail Equipment Accident/Incident database. 
The research presented in this thesis focuses on derailments and releases of hazardous materials, 
specifically three topics related to this general theme: unit train loading condition, the effect of 
train configuration on risk, and policies for implementation schedule for safer tank cars. 
 
 The effect of loading condition on unit-train derailment occurrence, causes and severity is 
described in Chapter 2. An algorithm was developed to identify derailments of loaded and empty 
unit trains on mainlines and sidings recorded in the Federal Railroad Administration database. A 
dataset of these accidents for the 15-year period from 2001 to 2015 was developed and analyzed. 
The frequency of derailments for both loaded and empty unit trains declined by more than 50%. 
The average number of cars derailed per accident fluctuated for both loading conditions but 
showed no particular trend. Approximately five times more loaded unit train derailments were 
recorded than empty unit trains but in the absence of specific unit train traffic data, inferences 
about rates are not possible. Loaded unit trains were more than four times heavier than empty 
unit trains, and loaded train derailments tended to involve more cars than empty train 
derailments. The distribution of derailment causes differed for loaded and empty unit trains. 
Loaded trains most frequently derailed due to broken rails and welds, while the leading cause of 
empty train derailments was obstructions, which included severe weather. Over 90% of the 
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derailments of loaded and empty unit trains considered in this study occurred on mainline tracks, 
and the distribution of causes differed between mainline and siding tracks. 
 
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the risk associated with transporting hazardous 
materials by unit trains versus manifest trains. While unit trains offer efficient transportation of 
hazardous materials, if these trains derail, the consequences can be particularly severe. 
Transporting hazardous materials in unit trains reduces exposure to accidents compared to 
transporting the same quantity of material in a larger number of manifest trains. However, in the 
event that a derailment of a unit train does occur, the consequences may be greater. Conversely, 
transportation in a larger number of manifest trains increases the exposure to derailments, but 
may reduce the severity if an accident occurs. An investigation of these trade-offs using the 
Multiple Tank Car Release model to conduct a series of simulations is presented. As part of this 
analysis the effect of using DOT 111 tank cars was compared to use of DOT 117 tank cars. Both 
the likelihood and consequence of transporting hazardous materials in these different train 
configurations were estimated and the metrics used to estimate risk were the distributions of 
number of tank cars derailed, number of tank cars releasing, and quantity released.  
 
Use of safer tank car specifications can substantially reduce the consequences and risk of 
derailments involving hazardous materials. Nevertheless, there are practical and financial 
considerations associated with replacing the existing fleet with new cars. Safer tank cars are 
generally more expensive to build and operate, and there may be practical constraints due to 
manufacturing capacity. In the late 2000s, the government and industry were faced with a choice of 
immediate adoption of a safer tank car for Toxic Inhalation Hazard materials, or awaiting the 
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results of a research and development project to develop an even safer car. The discussion between 
the government and industry regarding phase-in policies for safer tank cars led to the research 
described in Chapter 4. Specifically, how would different policies regarding deferral of the 
decision to implement safer cars, and the schedule of replacement affect risk. In Chapter 4, a 
methodology is presented to quantify the risk associated with rail transport of the top two toxic 
inhalation hazard materials by shipment, ammonia and chlorine. A network risk analysis model 
was used in conjunction with routing information, population, and the Multiple Tank Car Release 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Railroads play a critical role in the transportation and economic prosperity of North 
America. Train safety has improved considerably over the past decade and this trend continues; 
in 2016 the derailment rate was the lowest it has been since the Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) began recording data. Nevertheless, with the large volume of traffic, accidents still occur. 
Derailments are the most common type of train accidents recorded in the FRA’s Rail Equipment 
Accident/Incident (REA) database, comprising almost 70% of these accidents in the fifteen-year 
period from 2001 to 2015. Freight train derailments, especially those involving hazardous 
materials, have the potential to cause casualties and serious damage if there is a release of these 
materials. Such accidents have received increased attention from the railroad industry and the 
government in recent years due to the expanded transportation of flammable liquids and several 
high-profile derailments involving these products, along with ongoing concern regarding 
improving the safety of rail transport of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials. The research 
presented in this thesis focuses on derailments and releases of hazardous materials, specifically 
three topics related to this general theme: unit train loading condition, the effect of train 
configuration on risk, and policies for implementation schedule for safer tank cars.  
 
The use of unit trains has expanded substantially over the past century due to 
improvements in economies of scale and operating efficiency that they offer. Recent growth in 
North American production of flammable liquids has led to substantially expanded use of unit-
train transportation for these products over the past decade and a half (NASEM, 2017). Because 
of this, there is increased interest in factors affecting the safety of unit trains. Limited previous 
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research has focused on the effect of loading conditions on derailment characteristics. In Chapter 
2, I present a quantitative analysis of the derailment characteristics of loaded and empty unit 
trains, with specific attention to the relationship between unit train loading condition, and 
derailment occurrence and causes. I describe a methodology to identify loaded and empty unit 
trains in the FRA database and then present an analysis of the frequency and the severity of 
mainline derailments based on train loading condition. I also present an analysis of the most 
frequent causes of derailments for these two loading conditions of unit trains. 
 
While unit trains offer efficient transportation of hazardous materials, if these trains 
derail, the consequences can be particularly severe. Transporting hazardous materials in unit 
trains reduces exposure to accidents compared to transporting the same quantity of material in a 
larger number of manifest trains. However, in the event that a derailment of a unit train does 
occur, the consequences may be greater. Conversely, transportation in a larger number of 
manifest trains increases the exposure to derailments, but may reduce the severity if an accident 
occurs. In Chapter 3, I investigate these trade-offs using the Multiple Tank Car Release (MTCR) 
model to conduct a series of simulations. As part of this analysis I also consider the effect of 
using safer tank cars in these different train configurations. I estimated both the likelihood and 
consequence of transporting hazardous materials. The metrics used to estimate risk are the 
distributions of number of tank cars derailed, number of tank cars releasing, and quantity 
released.  
 
Use of safer tank car specifications can substantially reduce the consequences and risk of 
derailments involving hazardous materials. Nevertheless, there are practical and financial 
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considerations associated with replacing the existing fleet with new cars. Safer tank cars are 
generally more expensive to build and operate, and there may be practical constraints due to 
manufacturing capacity. In the late 2000s, the government and industry were faced with a choice 
of immediate adoption of a safer tank car for Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials, or 
awaiting the results of a research and development project to develop an even safer car. The 
discussion between the government and industry regarding phase-in policies for safer tank cars 
led to the research described in Chapter 4. Specifically, how would different policies regarding 
deferral of the decision to implement safer cars, and schedule of replacement affect risk. In 
Chapter 4, I present a methodology to quantify the risk associated with rail transport of the top 
two TIH materials by shipment, ammonia and chlorine. I used a network risk analysis model in 
conjunction with routing information, population, and the MTCR model to estimate several risk 
metrics under differing implementation scenarios. 
 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are each written as stand-alone papers. The paper that Chapter 2 is 
adapted from has been accepted for publication in the Transportation Research Record. Chapters 
3 and 4 will be further refined and submitted for consideration for future publication in peer-
reviewed journals. In Chapter 5, I summarize the insights and lessons learned from this research 
that can be incorporated into development and evaluation of risk mitigation strategies and 
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CHAPTER 2: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DERAILMENT 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LOADED AND EMPTY UNIT TRAINS 
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Introduction 
Railroads play a critical role in the transportation and economic prosperity of the North 
America. Train safety has improved considerably over the past decade. This trend continues; in 
2016 the derailment rate was the lowest it has been since the Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) began recording data. Nevertheless, with the large volume of traffic, accidents still occur. 
Derailments are the most common type of train accident recorded in the FRA’s Rail Equipment 
Accident/Incident (REA) database, comprising almost 70% of these accidents in the fifteen-year 
period from 2001 to 2015. Freight train derailments, especially those involving hazardous 
materials, have the potential to cause serious damage if there is a release of these materials. 
These types of accidents have received increased attention from the rail industry and the 
government in recent years due to the expansion in transportation of flammable liquids and 
several high-profile derailments involving these products. 
 
Unit trains are a specific type of rail service in which an entire train transports a single 
commodity from one origin to one destination. Unit trains increase the efficiency of railroad 
freight transportation by reducing operating expenses, using bulk loading, improving asset 
utilization, reducing transit time, and in general creating economies of scale (Grimes, 1981; 
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Grimes, 1982; Starr, 1976). Historically, unit trains transported coal and certain other bulk 
commodities (Starr, 1976). More recently, flammable liquid tank cars have begun traveling in 
unit train like movements (NASEM, 2017). For the purposes of this paper, “unit trains” will refer 
to fully loaded or empty trains having train type prefixes designating them as unit trains. These 
were determined from the “train number” column in the REA database; however, a more precise 
definition of unit trains can be found in Starr (1976). In terms of loading condition, unit trains are 
either fully loaded or empty. Most previous research on unit trains has focused on operational 
and economic questions, such as their productivity and profitability (Cacchiani et al., 2012; 
Clow, 1998; Grimes, 1981; Grimes, 1982; Starr, 1976). 
 
Previous research on train operating safety has included analyses of derailment frequency 
and consequences based on train speed (Yang et al., 1973) and derailment causes (Barkan et al., 
2003; Liu et al., 2012; Schafer and Barkan, 2008), but relatively little attention has been given to 
the effect of loading condition. Liu et al. (2013a) developed a zero-truncated negative binomial 
regression model for derailment severity that factors in loading condition; however, the authors 
are unaware of any prior research specifically focused on the relationship between unit train 
loading condition and derailment occurrence and cause. In this paper, the frequency and the 
severity of freight train derailments were analyzed based on different train loading conditions, 






The objective was to identify and quantify the effect of loading condition on freight train 
derailments, and to compare their causes for loaded and empty unit trains. To achieve this the 
following steps were taken: 
• Develop a methodology to identify loaded and empty unit trains recorded in the REA 
database 
• Build a database for derailments of loaded and empty unit trains 
• Analyze the resulting dataset to quantify the relationship between train loading condition 
and derailment frequency and severity 
• Evaluate the top derailment causes in terms of their frequency and average severity 
 
Methodology 
Previous studies have used monetary damage and number of cars derailed (Barkan et al., 
2003) to assess the severity of train derailments. In this paper, derailment severity is defined as 
the average number of cars derailed in an accident; and the frequency of derailments is defined 
as the number due to a particular cause. 
 
Data Source 
The FRA compiles train accident data based on reports submitted by railroads operating 
in the United States. The train derailment data used in this study were from the REA database. 
The REA database provides detailed accident information, including operational factors, 
environmental factors, train characteristics, damage conditions, and other information useful for 
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understanding the circumstances and causes of accidents. Railroads are required to submit 
reports to the REA database for all accidents that exceed a monetary threshold for damage and 
loss to infrastructure and equipment (FRA, 2011). This reporting threshold is periodically 
adjusted to account for inflation, rising from $6,600 in 2001 to $10,500 in 2014 (FRA, 2012). 
Derailment accidents for Class I railroads over the period from 2001 to 2015 were used for the 
analysis in this paper. 
 
Classification Method 
The REA data were used to develop a dataset that included all Class I railroad 
derailments of freight trains operating on Class I owned mainline or siding tracks. A total of 
6,047 such derailments were recorded for the fifteen-year period studied. To avoid including 
local trains, derailments of trains with less than 30 cars were excluded, leaving 5,395 for the 
analysis. Approximately 75% of unit trains subsequently identified in the dataset were greater 
than 50 cars in length. 
 
An algorithm was developed to identify loaded and empty unit trains in the REA dataset 
(Figure 2.1). The number of empty cars, the number of loaded cars, and the number of 
locomotives are recorded in the REA database. Using these fields, the length of a train in terms 
of total number of cars and locomotives could be calculated. The majority of unit trains transport 
various non-regulated commodities; however, those transporting hazardous materials generally 
have “buffer” cars, as required by federal regulation. Buffer cars are placed between occupied 
locomotives and cars transporting hazardous materials (FRA, 2005). Buffer cars can be either 
empty, or loaded with an inert material. To account for the possible presence of buffer cars, a 
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train was classified as loaded if 95% or more of its cars were loaded, or empty if 95% or more of 
its cars were empty. These percentages were calculated by dividing the number of loaded or 
empty cars by the total number of cars in the train. Since the buffer car loading condition is 
independent of the loading condition of the rest of the train, the 95% criterion was used for both 




Figure 2.1: Flowchart for Classifying Loaded and Empty Unit Trains 
 
After obtaining all loaded and empty unit train derailments, the remaining derailments 
were filtered based on their train type. Train type information was obtained using online 
resources to interpret and classify the “train number” field in the REA database 
(RailroadfanWiki, 2017; Train Symbol, 2017). This was done to eliminate derailments that were 
 REA data 2001 to 2015 
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not bulk unit trains, such as: manifest trains, intermodal trains, local trains, and work trains. Of 
the remainder, 1,536 derailments were classified as loaded unit trains, 303 were classified as 
empty unit trains, and 4,180 were classified as “other” trains (Figure 2.1).  
Loading-Condition Specific Derailment Analysis 
There were about five times more records of loaded trains than empty trains in the dataset. 
Several pertinent characteristics of these derailments were summarized (Table 2.1), including the 
tonnage of the train, train length, speed at derailment, number of cars derailed, position-of-
derailment (POD), and normalized position-of-derailment (NPOD), where NPOD is the POD 
normalized by train length (Anderson and Barkan, 2005). Student’s t-tests were used to assess 
the statistical significance of the differences in these characteristics for loaded and empty unit 
trains. The characteristics of other derailments were also included for comparison.  
 





















Other 4,180 7.1 77.9 22.5 8.3 11.4 45.0% 
Loaded 1,536 14.2 106.9 25.1 11.5 54.4 51.0% 
Empty 303 3.0 106.8 24.8 8.9 41.8 40.2% 
P-Value -- <0.001 0.945 0.786 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 
Not surprisingly, the weight of loaded unit trains was considerably heavier than empty 
trains, differing more than four-fold. The average derailment speed of loaded and empty unit 
trains did not significantly differ (25.1 and 24.8 mph respectively), nor did average train length 
(106.9 and 106.8 respectively). Empty unit trains derailed an average of 8.9 cars per derailment, 
while loaded train derailments averaged 11.5 cars or about 30% more, which was also significant. 
Considering that derailment speed and train length did not differ significantly, but total train 
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weight did, the higher average number of cars derailed is consistent with Liu et al.’s (2013a) 
results regarding the effect of loading factor. They found that derailment severity depends on 
derailment speed, residual length, and loading factor. In addition to derailing more cars, the POD 
and NPOD for loaded unit trains was significantly farther back in the train compared to empty 
unit trains. This outcome could be due to a difference in derailment cause distributions for loaded 
and empty trains (Barkan et al., 2003; Liu, 2015). 
 
Derailment Frequency and Severity Trend  
  The trend in the frequency and severity of derailments was investigated (Figure 2.2). The 
number of derailments in each of the three categories of train type differed substantially so the 
data were normalized, and the percentages were used to facilitate comparison. The derailment 
frequency for loaded unit trains, empty unit trains, and other trains declined by about 55%, 63%, 
and 60% respectively over the 15-year period (Figure 2.2a). This is consistent with the trend for 
all derailments, which declined 58% over the 15-year study period. The derailment severity of 
empty unit trains was generally less than that of loaded unit trains (Table 2.1) but fluctuated 
widely from year to year (Figure 2.2b). For example, in 2015, derailment severity for empty unit 
trains was higher than that of loaded unit trains; however, this was due to a single incident in 
Iowa in which a tornado derailed 87 cars in an empty unit train. Since the sample size for empty 
unit trains was relatively small, extreme incidents such as this one sometimes shifted the average 
for a given year. While derailment severity for other trains is less than that of unit trains, it 

















































































Although extreme accidents can influence average derailment severity, they are 
uncommon. To understand the distribution of derailment frequency and severity, the number of 
derailments was plotted against the number of cars derailed per accident (Figure 2.3). The 
cumulative percentage of cars derailed was also used to compare the distributions of the three 
train loading conditions. The cumulative curve for loaded unit trains was well to the right of the 
curve for empty unit trains, consistent with the finding that empty unit trains derail fewer cars 
than loaded. Interestingly, the cumulative curve for “other” trains was similar to the curve for 
empty unit train derailments. These other trains averaged about 2.4 times heavier than empty unit 
trains, but they still weighed only half as much on average compared to loaded unit trains. Other 




Figure 2.3: Distribution of Derailment Severity for Loaded and Empty Unit, 




























































ADL Accident Cause Group Comparison 
The FRA provides a detailed list of accident causes and associated cause codes for 
railroads to use when reporting accidents to the REA database (FRA, 2011; FRA, 2017). FRA 
organizes its cause codes into a hierarchical structure of related groups of causes. Arthur D. 
Little (ADL) Inc. worked with the Association of American Railroads (AAR) in the early 1990s 
to develop a variant of the FRA grouping based on input from railroad engineering and 
mechanical experts (ADL, 1996). The objective of the ADL grouping was to better link causes 
that could be addressed through similar or related preventative measures. Each FRA cause code 
maps to a unique ADL cause group. The first step in the causal analysis was to identify the top 
ten ADL cause groups for the two loading conditions and rank them by the number of 






Table 2.2: Frequency and Severity of the Top 10 Cause Groups* for (a) Loaded and (b) Empty 
Unit Train Derailments 
 
(a) Loaded Unit Trains 




of Cars Derailed 
1 Broken Rails or Welds 288 18.8% 14.7 
2 Broken Wheels (Car) 175 11.4% 8.3 
3 Other Axle/Journal Defects (Car) 127 8.3% 8.9 
4 Bearing Failure (Car) 122 7.9% 6.7 
5 Buckled Track 93 6.1% 15.4 
6 Track Geometry (excl. Wide Gauge) 80 5.2% 9.2 
7 Wide Gauge 74 4.8% 10.5 
8 Roadbed Defects 44 2.9% 13.7 
9 Turnout Defects - Switches 41 2.7% 5.4 
10 Other Rail and Joint Defects 36 2.3% 24.9 
 
(b) Empty Unit Trains 




of Cars Derailed 
1 Obstructions 50 16.5% 17.8 
2 Broken Rails or Welds 31 10.2% 15.5 
3 Track Geometry (excl. Wide Gauge) 25 8.3% 6.4 
4 Other Wheel Defects (Car) 24 7.9% 2.8 
5 Buckled Track 15 5.0% 12.5 
6 Lading Problems 13 4.3% 3.3 
7 Other Brake Defect (Car) 10 3.3% 1.8 
8 All Other Car Defects 10 3.3% 3.9 
9 Train Handling (excl. Brakes) 9 3.0% 5.6 
10 Non-Traffic, Weather Causes 8 2.6% 4.9 
 





The top ten cause groups for the two loading conditions were plotted on a frequency 
versus severity graph (Figure 2.4). The graph is divided into four quadrants by the average 
frequency and average severity of the top ten derailment cause groups. The most frequent and 
severe causes fall in the upper right quadrant; cause groups in this quadrant have both above-
average severity and above-average frequency (Barkan et al., 2003; Dick et al., 2003; Liu et al., 
2013b). The top ten derailment cause groups for loaded and empty unit trains have different 
distributions (Table 2.2, Figure 2.4). For loaded unit trains, broken rails or welds was the leading 
cause group in terms of both frequency and severity. This cause group accounted for about 20% 
of loaded unit train derailments with an average of about 15 cars derailing per accident. Broken 
rails or welds was the second leading cause of empty unit train derailments; however, 
obstructions accounted for the largest percentage of empty unit train derailments at 16.5% and 
also had the highest number of cars derailed with 18 cars on average. The obstructions cause 
group includes extreme environmental condition, which will be further discussed below. Cause 
groups shared between the two loading conditions included broken rails or welds, track geometry 











Figure 2.4: Frequency Versus Severity Graphs for the Top 10 Cause Groups for  
(a) Loaded and (b) Empty Unit Train Derailments 
 














































Average frequency = 108
Average severity = 11.4
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Average frequency = 19.5
Average severity = 10.1
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  As mentioned above, there was a five-fold difference in the number of derailment 
accidents for loaded versus empty unit trains. To facilitate comparison, the number of 
derailments due to each cause group was normalized by the total number of derailments for each 
loading condition to calculate a percentage (Figure 2.5). The lines dividing the quadrants are the 
averages for severity and percentage of derailments for the top ten derailment cause groups for 
both loading conditions combined. The labels for the three cause groups shared by both loading 
conditions – broken rails or welds, buckled track, and track geometry (excl. wide gauge) – are 
highlighted in yellow and shown in bold italic. Figure 2.5 enables comparison of the relative 
frequency and severity of derailment cause groups under the two loading conditions. For 
example, derailments caused by track geometry excluding wide gauge resulted in derailments 
with similar severity for both loading conditions; however, this cause group accounted for a 







Figure 2.5: Relative Frequency Versus Severity for the Top 10 Cause Groups for 
Loaded and Empty Unit Train Derailments 
 
   
  To further understand the top causes for loaded and empty unit train derailments, they 
were analyzed in more detail. Specifically, loaded unit train derailments due to broken rails or 
welds, and empty unit train derailments due to obstructions were broken down by their 
individual FRA cause codes (Table 2.3). 66% of loaded unit train derailments caused by broken 
rails or welds were due to just two FRA cause codes: detail fracture and transverse/compound 
fissure. In comparison, about 70% of empty unit train derailments caused by “obstructions” were 
due to extreme environmental conditions, and most of these were due to just two FRA cause 
codes: extreme wind velocity and tornado. Tornados were also the cause of the most severe 
accidents, derailing 52 cars on average in each of the five events recorded. 
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Average percentage = 6.7%
Average severity = 11.2
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Table 2.3: Frequency and Severity of the Top FRA Cause Codes for (a) Loaded and (b) Empty 
Unit Train Derailments 
 
(a) Loaded Unit Train Derailments Caused by Broken Rails or Welds 




of Cars Derailed 
1 Detail fracture from shelling or 
head check 
95 33.0% 16.4 
1 Transverse/compound fissure 95 33.0% 14.2 
3 Vertical split head 28 9.7% 12.1 
4 Weld (field) 24 8.3% 15.9 
5 Head and web separation 
(outside joint bar limits) 
21 7.3% 10.1 
6 Base 14 4.9% 17.3 
7 Engine burn fracture 4 1.4% 13.8 
8 Horizontal split head 4 1.4% 14.3 
9 Piped rail 2 0.7% 9.5 
10 Weld (plant) 1 0.3% 23.0 
 
 
(b) Empty Unit Train Derailments Caused by Obstructions 




of Cars Derailed 
1 Extreme environmental 
condition - Extreme wind velocity 
27 54.0% 19.9 
2 Snow, ice, mud, gravel, coal, 
sand, etc. on track 
11 22.0% 3.0 
3 Extreme environmental 
condition - Tornado 
5 10.0% 52.0 
4 Object or equipment on or 
fouling track (other than above) 
4 8.0% 6.3 
5 Extreme environmental 
condition - Flood 
2 4.0% 10.0 
6 Other extreme 
environmental conditions 





Top Ten Causes on Mainline and Siding Tracks 
The data used in this study included derailments on both mainline and siding tracks. 
There were 1,426 (93%) derailments of loaded unit trains on mainlines and 110 (7%) on sidings.  
For empty trains, 275 (91%) occurred on mainline tracks, and 28 (9%) were on sidings. A 
question of interest was whether these two types of track differed in their distribution of 
derailment causes. For example, sidings might have a higher percentage of switch-related 
derailments due to the greater relative frequency of turnouts on siding tracks compared to 
mainlines. Conversely, the higher operating speeds of mainline tracks might result in a higher 
percentage of derailments due to equipment causes (Liu et al., 2012). There were insufficient 
empty unit train derailments for a meaningful comparison of their distributions so the 
comparison of mainline and siding track accident causes was limited to loaded unit trains only. 
The top ten cause groups for these trains were ranked by number of derailments on each type of 
track (Table 2.4).  
 
Among the top ten, broken rails or welds, wide gauge, track geometry excluding wide 
gauge, and buckled track were common to both mainline and siding tracks, indicated in bold in 
Table 2.4. As suggested above, three of the top ten cause groups for derailments on siding tracks 
were switch related, accounting for about 20% of the total, whereas none of the top ten mainline 
cause groups were switch related. Also as suggested, four of the top ten cause groups on 
mainline tracks were equipment related, accounting for 32% of the total, while on sidings only 




Table 2.4: Frequency and Severity of the Top Ten Derailment Cause Groups* for Loaded Unit 
Train Derailments on (a) Mainline Track and (b) Siding Track 
 
 
(a) Mainline Track 




of Cars Derailed 
1 Broken Rails or Welds 262 18.4% 15.2 
2 Broken Wheels (Car) 174 12.2% 8.3 
3 Other Axle/Journal Defects (Car) 126 8.8% 8.9 
4 Bearing Failure (Car) 121 8.5% 6.8 
5 Buckled Track 90 6.3% 15.5 
6 Track Geometry (excl. Wide Gauge) 72 5.0% 9.7 
7 Wide Gauge 53 3.7% 11.6 
8 Roadbed Defects 42 2.9% 13.9 
9 Coupler Defects (Car) 36 2.5% 7.4 
10 Other Rail and Joint Defects 34 2.4% 25.9 
 
 
(b) Siding Track 
Rank ADL Cause Group 
Number of 
Derailments Percentage 
Average Number of 
Cars Derailed 
1 Broken Rails or Welds 26 23.6% 9.8 
2 Wide Gauge 21 19.1% 7.8 
3 Turnout Defects - Switches 12 10.9% 5.1 
4 Track Geometry (excl. Wide Gauge) 8 7.3% 4.8 
5 Switching Rules 6 5.5% 4.2 
6 Use of Switches 4 3.6% 3.5 
7 All Other Car Defects 3 2.7% 5.3 
8 Buckled Track 3 2.7% 11.3 
9 Joint Bar Defects 3 2.7% 7.7 
10 Misc. Track and Structure Defects 2 1.8% 6.0 
 





Discussion and Future Research 
  The differing frequency of loaded versus empty unit train derailments recorded in the 
FRA REA database might suggest a difference in the derailment rate for the two loading 
conditions, or it may simply indicate that fully loaded unit trains accrue more mileage, and 
therefore more exposure to potential derailment circumstances than empty unit trains. The latter 
is unlikely to be the case for “shuttle” trains that travel back and forth as a unit between the same 
origin and destination for loading and unloading. However, there are other types of unit-train-
like operations in which cars travel together while loaded, but after they reach their destination 
and are unloaded, the empty cars may not remain together, or even return to the same origin. 
Overall, railcars travel about 40% more car-miles while loaded than empty (AAR, 2015); 
however, this difference by itself is not enough to account for the possible difference in exposure 
mentioned above. Consequently, specific traffic data for loaded and empty unit trains are needed 
to address the effect of loading condition on derailment rate. It is plausible that some derailment 
causes are influenced by the greater weight of a loaded rail vehicle. Such causes could include 
failure of certain railcar components or elements of the track structure it is traveling over. In 
general, these component failures would be expected to occur irrespective of a car’s placement in 
a unit train. FRA regulations, AAR interchange standards, American Railway Engineering and 
Maintenance-of-Way Association recommended practices, and the track design, maintenance, 
and inspection standards of individual railroads are all intended to prevent such failures. It is 
hoped that the results presented here will provide insight into the failure modes associated with 
loaded and empty unit train operation and inform research on the most effective means of 






The use of unit trains has expanded substantially over the past half century due to the 
substantial improvements in economies of scale, equipment utilization, operating efficiencies, 
and transit times that they offer when transporting bulk commodities such as coal and grain. 
Over the past decade and a half, growth in domestic production of flammable liquids has led to 
expanded rail transport of these products in unit trains as well. This has led to increased interest 
in the factors affecting the safety performance of unit trains. Limited previous research has 
considered the relationship between the loading condition of unit trains and associated 
derailment causes. In this study, a methodology was developed to classify loaded and empty unit 
trains using the FRA REA database. The resultant dataset enabled analysis of a number of 
questions not previously investigated that provides new insights about the factors affecting unit 
train safety. Over the fifteen-year period, the frequency of derailments for both loading 
conditions declined more than 50% while the average derailment severity for both loading 
conditions fluctuated but showed no particular trend. Approximately five times more loaded unit 
train derailments were recorded in the REA database than empty unit trains but in the absence of 
specific unit train traffic data, inferences about differences in derailment rates are not possible. 
Loaded unit trains were more than four times heavier than empty unit trains, and loaded train 
derailments tended to involve more cars than empty trains. The distribution of derailment causes 
also differed, with broken rails or welds being the leading cause group for loaded unit trains, and 
obstructions, including extreme environmental conditions such as extreme wind velocity, being 
the leading cause group for empty unit trains. Over 90% of the derailments of loaded and empty 
unit trains considered in this study occurred on mainline tracks, and the distribution of causes 
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CHAPTER 3: COMPARATIVE RISK OF TRANSPORTING HAZARDOUS 




Over the past decade, unit-train transport of tank cars carrying hazardous materials, 
especially flammable liquids, has increased substantially. This is due to the greater efficiencies 
afforded by unit trains through reductions in operating expenses, bulk loading, and other 
economies of scale (Grimes, 1981; Grimes, 1982; Starr, 1976). While unit trains are efficient at 
transporting large quantities of a single commodity, if that commodity is hazardous, they also 
introduce the possibility of larger derailments and spills of these materials. Conversely, 
transportation in manifest trains requires more trains and thus increases the potential for 
exposure to a possible derailment. Given these trade-offs, it is important to understand the 
relative risks associated with transporting hazardous materials in these different types of trains.  
 
There has only been limited research comparing these risks (Liu, 2017). In this chapter, 
I use a risk analysis model to quantify both the likelihood and consequence of transporting 
hazardous materials using unit trains and manifest trains in two different tank car specifications, 
DOT 111s and DOT 117s. The metrics used to assess consequences are the number of tank cars 
derailed, the number of tank cars releasing, and the quantity released. The goal is to develop a 
methodology and the insight needed to quantify the risk associated with different train 
configurations and tank car specifications to inform risk-management decision-making for 






To understand the effect of train configurations on risk, Liu (2017) developed a risk 
analysis model to quantify the risk associated with a release and investigated different scenarios 
of tank car positions that generate the highest and the lowest risk, along with random tank car 
positioning for comparison. He found that if tank cars are positioned to give the lowest risk, i.e., 
placing them in the back of the train, transporting hazardous materials in manifest trains reduces 
the probability of a release incident compared to transporting them in unit trains; and if the tank 
cars are positioned at random or positioned to give the highest risk, the probability of release is 
higher for manifest trains compared to unit trains. 
 
 Operationally, cars are frequently positioned in groups if they have destinations in 
common. However, without knowing the destinations and the positions of different groups, 
random placement of tank cars in a train consist is more realistic, so that was how car placement 
was considered in this analysis. In addition to investigating the probability of releases, this paper 
also quantifies the severity of incidents in terms of the number of tank cars derailed, the number 
of tank cars releasing, and the quantity released. To quantify the risk, the Multiple Tank Car 
Release (MTCR) model described by Liu et al. (2014) was used. 
 
Methodology 
There are two components to risk, probability and consequence. In this chapter, risk 
refers to the product of the probability and consequence. The probability was estimated using the 
MTCR model, and the consequence was estimated using the Expected Quantity Released (EQR) 
model. The MTCR model calculates the distribution of tank cars derailed and tank cars releasing 
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by calculating the distribution for each of a series of variables. The MTCR model follows a 
logical sequence of events beginning with a train derailment, followed by cars derailed, tank cars 
derailed, and tank cars releasing (Figure 3.1). The main inputs for the MTCR model are train 
characteristics, track characteristics and tank car conditional probability of release. Details for 
this part of the model can be found in Liu et al. (2014). The distribution it produces is 
summarized in the following equation: 








K = point of derailment (POD) (position of first car derailed) 
POD(K) = probability distribution of point of derailment 
X = number of cars (tank cars and non-tank cars) derailed 
P(X|K) = probability distribution of number of cars derailed given point of derailment 
XD = number of tank cars derailed 
P(XD|X) = probability distribution of tank cars derailed given total number of cars derailed 
XR = number of tank cars releasing 
P(XR|XD) = probability distribution of tank cars releasing given number of tank cars derailed 





Figure 3.1: Flow Chart of the MTCR Model (Modified from Liu et al., 2014) 
 
After the MTCR model produced the distribution of tank cars releasing, the distribution 
of quantity released was calculated using the EQR model. The model was developed based on 
statistics developed by the Railway Supply Institute (RSI) – Association of American Railroads 
(AAR), Railroad Tank Car Safety Research and Test Project that estimated probability 
distributions of quantity lost from tank cars in accidents (Treichel et al, 2006). The lading lost 
from each tank car is divided into five levels with the corresponding probabilities (Table 3.1). 
The tank car capacity was assumed to be 30,000 and 31,800 gallons for crude oil transported by 
DOT 111 and DOT 117 tank cars respectively (AFPM, 2014). Based on the average percentage 
of quantity released for each level, the quantity released in gallons can be calculated. The EQR 
model assumes that the quantity released for each tank car is independent of other cars in the 
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train. Thus, a one-car release has five outcomes, and a twenty-car release will have five to the 
power of twenty combinations of outcomes.  
 
Table 3.1: Lading Loss Categories 
 
Quantity 
Released (QR) Average QR Probability 
0%-5% 2.5% 0.193 
5%-20% 12.5% 0.092 
20%-50% 35.0% 0.139 
50%-80% 65.0% 0.128 
80%-100% 90.0% 0.447 
 
 
To compare the risk associated with unit trains and manifest trains, four scenarios were 
used to transport 20 tank cars of petroleum crude oil per day for the same distance over a one-
year period as follows: one unit train of 100 tank cars every five days, or more frequent manifest 
trains with 50, 20 and 10 tank cars operating every two, one, and one-half days, respectively. In 
all scenarios, train length was standardized to control for train characteristics. The length of all 
trains was held constant at 102 cars plus four locomotives, which is a typical length for unit 
trains on Class I railroads (Chapter 2 and Li et al., 2018). The number of annual tank-car miles 
was constant, but the number of trains varied, with manifest trains requiring more annual trips 
(Table 3.2). These scenarios were studied with two tank car specifications: conventional, non-
jacketed US DOT 111 and DOT 117. The gross rail load (GRL) of fully loaded DOT 111 tank 
cars and other cars was assumed to be 131.5 tons; and the GRL of DOT 117 tank cars was 





Table 3.2: Train Characteristics 
 
Train Characteristics Unit Train 
Non Unit Train 
50 
Non Unit Train 
20 
Non Unit Train 
10 
Train length 106 106 106 106 
   -Number of tank cars 100 50 20 10 
   -Number of other cars 2 52 82 92 
Number of trains per year 73 146 365 730 
 
 
All trains travelled on the same hypothetical route with the following characteristics: 
100 miles long, signaled, and annual traffic greater than 20 MGT (Table 3.3). These general 
characteristics are typical of many parts of the U.S. Class I railroad mainline network (Keefe, 
2016, Liu et al, 2017) including many of the routes over which flammable liquids are shipped. 
The year of estimation used for all scenarios and tank car specifications was 2009, which was the 
last year of the analysis period for the comprehensive derailment rate estimates (Liu et al., 2017).  
The derailment rate has declined since then, so the risk estimates presented here are higher than 
what would be expected using current derailment rates. 
 
In addition to train and route characteristics, the conditional probability of release (CPR) 
for the specific tank car designs used is an input to the MTCR model. CPR varies based on 
factors such as tank car specification and derailment speed. The tank car specifications used in 
this analysis and the average CPR for the two tank car specifications are shown in Table 3.4. All 
three principal inputs were used to generate distributions of the number of tank cars derailed, 
number of tank cars releasing, and quantity released. These metrics were used to assess the risk 
of transporting the same number of tank cars per year, but in different train configurations as 
discussed above. In addition to the tank cars of interest in this analysis, the manifest trains were 
assumed to transport other cars carrying various non-regulated materials. In the case of unit 
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trains, the other cars were buffer cars, which are required by federal regulation to be placed 
between occupied locomotives and cars carrying hazardous materials (FRA, 2005). 
 





(Miles) % Length 
1 0 0% 
2 5 5% 
3 15 15% 
4 80 80% 
5 0.0 0.0% 
 
Method of 
Operation Length % Length 
Signaled 100 100% 
Dark 0 0% 
 
Annual 
Traffic Length % Length 
>20 MGT 100 100% 
<20 MGT 0 0% 
  
Table 3.4: Tank Car Specifications and Conditional Probability of Release (CPR) 
 



















DOT 111 0.4375 0.4375 No No 119  0.239   




Number of Tank Cars Derailed  
Results from the MTCR model can be represented in different ways. An inverse 
cumulative distribution was used, in which the value on the x-axis is the number of derailed tank 
cars, and the value on the y-axis is the expected number of derailments with greater than or equal 
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to the corresponding value on the x-axis (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). The MTCR model was used for 
each tank car specification, DOT 111 (Figures 3.2a and 3.3a) and DOT 117 (Figures 3.2b and 
3.3b). For example, in Figure 3.2a, the expected number of derailments of unit trains where 20 or 
more tank cars derailed is about 2.0E-05. As mentioned above, the DOT 117 has a higher GRL 
than the DOT 111 and other cars in the trains simulated. Using a ton-mile based derailment rate, 
the heavier the train, the higher the derailment rate. Unit trains of DOT 117s are all higher GRL 
cars, so the derailment rate in Figure 3.2b is slightly higher than in Figure 3.2a and other 
scenarios.  
 
Unit trains have a greater risk of a high consequence derailment because they have more 
tank cars per train than the other scenarios. That is why the per-trip curve of the unit train is 
higher than others in Figure 3.2. On the other hand, tank cars traveling in unit trains have a lower 
likelihood of being in a train that derails because fewer trains are required to move the same 
volume and therefore these tank cars have less exposure to derailments. A unit train has a lower 
expected number of small derailments, but the distribution also has a longer, higher tail, meaning 
that the expected number of larger derailments is higher (Figure 3.3). The effect of the weight 
difference on the annual expected number of derailments for DOT 111 and DOT 117 was 
minimal when comparing Figure 3.3a to Figure 3.3b. To facilitate the comparison of these 










Figure 3.2: Inverse Cumulative Distribution of Derailment Incidents per Train Trip  

























































































































Figure 3.3: Inverse Cumulative Distribution of Annual Expected Number of Derailments 























































































































Table 3.5: Summary Statistics for Distributions of Number of Tank Cars Derailed 
 
 
Expected Number of Derailments 
 







Per Trip 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Per Year 0.008 0.016 0.039 0.078 
 
     
DOT 117 
Per Trip 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Per Year 0.008 0.016 0.040 0.079 
 
 
Expected Number of Tank Cars Derailed per Trip 
 







Expected Value 0.0012 0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 
Variance 0.027 0.007 0.001 0.000 
      
DOT 117 
Expected Value 0.0013 0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 
Variance 0.029 0.007 0.001 0.000 
 
 
Expected Annual Number of Tank Cars Derailed 
 







Expected Value 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 
Variance 1.933 0.996 0.434 0.246 
      
DOT 117 
Expected Value 0.092 0.088 0.086 0.086 






The expected number of derailments per train trip for all scenarios, regardless of how 
many cars derailed and the tank car specifications, is about the same (Table 3.5). However, for 
the expected annual number of derailments, unit trains are less likely to be involved in a 
derailment because they make fewer trips. If the number of cars derailed is also considered, the 
expected number and the variance of the number of tank cars derailed per trip for unit trains is 
higher than other scenarios. This is due to the larger number of tank cars per unit-train consist.  
 
The expected value for the annual number of tank cars derailed is the highest for the unit 
train scenario. In addition, the variance in the annual number of tank cars derailed for the unit 
train scenario is also the largest, indicating that the consequences are more variable, both above 
and below the expected value. Again, the difference in expected number of derailments between 
the different shipping scenarios with DOT 117 tank cars is caused by the assumed difference in 
GRL. Even though unit trains of DOT 117 tank cars have a slightly higher estimated likelihood 
of derailment, the quantity of material transported will also be larger due to their higher capacity 
compared to DOT 111s.  
 
Number of Tank Cars Releasing 
The distributions of the number of tank cars releasing per trip and per year were also plotted 
(Figures 3.4 and 3.5). Again, unit trains have a higher expected number of releases per trip with 
distributions higher than other scenarios. There is a trade-off between frequency and severity in 
annual number of tank cars releasing. Although unit trains have fewer derailments with a smaller 
number of tank cars releasing, they have more derailments with a large number of tank cars 
releasing. The summary statistics for these distributions were calculated to quantify the 
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difference in these distributions (Table 3.6). Note that DOT 117s substantially reduce the number 
of tank cars releasing compared to DOT 111s.  
 
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics for Distributions of Number of Tank Cars Releasing 
 











Per Trip 0.00008 0.00006 0.00004 0.00002 
Per Year   0.0059   0.0092   0.0140    0.0171 
      
DOT 117 
Per Trip 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001  0.00000 
Per Year   0.0028   0.0030  0.0030    0.0030 
 
 
Expected Number of Tank Cars Releasing per Trip 
 







Expected Value 0.00039 0.00016 0.00006 0.00003 
Variance 0.00494 0.00079 0.00013 0.00004 
      
DOT 117 
Expected Value 0.00008 0.00003 0.00001 0.00000 
Variance 0.00044 0.00005 0.00001 0.00000 
 
 
Expected Annual Number of Tank Cars Releasing 
 







Expected Value 0.028 0.024 0.022 0.021 
Variance 0.360 0.114 0.047 0.032 
      
DOT 117 
Expected Value 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003 










Figure 3.4: Inverse Cumulative Distribution of Derailment Incidents per Train Trip 





























































































































Figure 3.5: Inverse Cumulative Distribution of Annual Expected Number of Derailments 


























































































































Expected Quantity Released 
The estimated probability of release from the MTCR model was used as input to the EQR 
model to calculate distributions of the total quantity released (Figures 3.6 and 3.7), which 
provides insight into the size of release. There is a large amount of variance in the EQR output, 
so the distributions are clearly separated in these figures. The distribution for unit trains in Figure 
3.7 is lower than the other scenarios on the left, and it crosses over the other distributions and 
remains above the other distributions on the right. This indicates that unit train derailments are 
less likely to occur, but as stated previously, they have higher potential consequences if they do. 
Expected quantity released per trip for unit trains is higher, and annual expected quantity 
released for unit trains is also higher in terms of both expected value and variance (Table 3.7). 











Figure 3.6: Inverse Cumulative Distribution of Derailment Incidents per Train Trip  





























































































































Figure 3.7: Inverse Cumulative Distribution of Annual Expected Number of Derailments  


























































































































Table 3.7: Summary Statistics for Distributions of Quantity Released 
 
 
Expected Quantity Released per Trip (Gallons) 
 







Expected Value           6.3          2.7          1.0          0.5 
Variance 1.38×E6 2.33×E5 4.24×E4 1.56×E4 
      
DOT 117 
Expected Value          1.4          0.5          0.2          0.1 
Variance 1.43×E5 1.78×E4 4.46×E3 2.00×E3 
 
 
Expected Annual Expected Quantity Released (Gallons) 
 







Expected Value      462.9      393.9      360.7      354.6 
Variance 1.00×E8 3.39×E7 1.53×E7 1.12×E7 
      
DOT 117 
Expected Value      101.0        69.0        57.5        55.2 




In this chapter, I compared the risk associated with transporting the same number of tank 
cars annually via unit trains or manifest trains with different numbers of tank cars per trip using 
DOT 111 and DOT 117 tank cars. The metrics used to assess risk are the number of tank cars 
derailed, the number of tank cars releasing, and the quantity released. These metrics each had 
similar distributions and the same qualitative results, but the magnitude of difference between 




For risk per trip, unit trains had higher risk because there are more tank cars per consist. 
For annual risk, unit trains had lower expected number of derailments and release incidents, and 
higher expected value and variance for number of tank cars derailed and releasing. Safer tank 
cars such as DOT 117s do not reduce the risk of being involved in a derailment, but they do 




This chapter is intended to provide a preliminary understanding of the tradeoffs between 
the use of unit trains and manifest trains for transport of hazardous materials. Some limitations in 
this research remain; for example, tank cars were assumed to be randomly distributed in the 
train, but tank car positions affect risk (Liu, 2017). Future work should consider the tank car 
positions in the train that generate the highest and the lowest risk to provide upper and lower 
bounds for the effect on risk.  
 
Another limitation is that all the trains were assumed to use the same route. However, 
unit trains may use more direct routes than manifest trains thereby reducing their exposure to 
derailments. Manifest trains also require more time spent in classification yards where they are 
exposed to additional potential incidents. Even though the expected number of releases within 
yards is relatively small, the consequence of these accidents may be a concern if they are located 
near population centers. This yard component of risk for manifest trains was not accounted for in 
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CHAPTER 4: EFFECT OF IMPLEMENTATION POLICIES FOR SAFER TANK CARS 




In 2009, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSA) promulgated a rule requiring all tank cars built after 2009 for 
transportation of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) / poisonous inhalation hazard (PIH) materials to 
be compliant with new, interim DOT design standards (PHMSA, 2009). Cars built in compliance 
with these new, safer, interim standards came to be known as "I-Cars". At that time, it was 
estimated that I-Cars reduce the probability of release if they were derailed in a Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA) reportable mainline accident (conditional probability of release, aka CPR), 
by about 50% compared to the existing tank cars (aka "Legacy Cars") used to transport TIH 
materials (ATCCRP, 2016). Meanwhile, a new public-private collaborative research effort, the 
Advanced Tank Car Collaborative Research Program (ATCCRP), was launched with the 
objective of developing a new, substantially safer, final tank car design that was intended to 
supersede the I-Car. PHMSA specified that I-Cars would have a 20-year allowable life, but 
placed no restrictions on continued use of the existing fleet of legacy tank cars to transport TIH 
materials (PHMSA, 2009). The 20-year allowable life of the I-Cars was less than the normal 50-
year life for tank cars. PHMSA’s intent was to set standards on an interim basis “until such time 
as final performance standards are developed and tank cars are available meeting such 
standards” (PHMSA, 2009). In so doing, PHMSA created a disincentive to implementation of 




Aiming to achieve higher tank car safety standards, the ATCCRP conducted extensive 
research over the next eight years, including modeling, physical testing, simulation, and 
statistical analysis on a broad range of tank car elements and design considerations. This 
program developed a great deal of new and useful information that has advanced the 
understanding of tank car safety design; however, as the work of the ATCCRP progressed, it 
became evident that the program would not develop a specification that was both substantially 
safer than the I-Cars and reasonable from an economic and manufacturability standpoint 
(ATCCRP, 2016). Consequently, the ATCCRP partners submitted a petition to the PHMSA in 
2016 requesting that the I-Car be made the permanent standard design for tank cars transporting 
TIH materials (ATCCRP, 2016). ATCCRP research would continue with the objective of 
identifying incremental improvements that could be incorporated into ongoing updates and 
improvements in tank car safety under the normal processes of the PHMSA and the Association 
of American Railroads (AAR) Tank Car Committee. In 2017, the PHMSA determined that the 
petition submitted by the ATCCRP merits consideration in future rulemaking (PHMSA, 2017). 
Currently, the industry is awaiting the final decision from PHMSA, and discussions about plans 
and schedule to phase in I-Cars are ongoing.  
 
In this chapter, I consider several questions stemming from the PHMSA’s decision in 
2009 to defer action on a final specification for TIH tank cars. I present a risk analysis 
methodology and results related to the general question of how much the risk would be reduced 
under varying implementation scenarios for the new I-Cars. I also compare the results of 
hypothetical scenarios to the current, attrition-based implementation plan for I-Cars that is close 
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to the actual effect of the rulemaking in 2009 requiring new tank cars to be compliant with I-Car 
standards. In particular, three questions were of interest: 
1. In 2009, what is the estimated risk differential under various possible phase-in strategies 
of I-Cars compared to continuing the use of legacy tank cars without any restrictions? 
2. In 2012, how much safer would a new tank car design produced by the ATCCRP have 
had to be to compensate for the additional risk incurred due to delaying onset of a 10-year 
implementation of the I-Car beginning in 2009? 




I used a Network Risk Analysis model to quantify the risk of transporting TIH materials. 
Several key metrics were calculated under varying implementation scenarios, including number 
of derailments involving TIH tank cars, number of TIH tank cars that released in these accidents 
and the estimated population affected. The objective is to provide a risk analysis framework and  




The risk analysis method used railroad traffic data and a Network Risk Analysis model 
that combines network route information, spatial population data and the Multiple Tank Car 
Release (MTCR) model to estimate the total population affected. This chapter investigates the 
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risk associated with transporting the top two TIH commodities by volume, ammonia and chlorine 
(AAR, 2016). 
To estimate the probability of a release, a risk model was used that incorporated the 
MTCR model, along with railroad route, track characteristics and population. The MTCR model 
uses three principal inputs – train characteristics, track characteristics, and the conditional 
probability of release (CPR) of tank cars – to estimate several probability distributions related to 
derailment caused events that can lead to a release. Further details can be found in Liu et al. 
(2014). The model output includes the probability distribution of the number of tank cars 
releasing using the following equation (Liu et al., 2014): 








K = point of derailment (POD) (position of first car derailed) 
POD(K) = probability distribution of point of derailment 
X = number of cars (tank cars and non-tank cars) derailed 
P(X|K) = probability distribution of number of cars derailed given point of derailment 
XD = number of tank cars derailed 
P(XD|X) = probability distribution of tank cars derailed given total number of cars derailed 
XR = number of tank cars releasing 
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P(XR|XD) = probability distribution of tank cars releasing given number of tank cars derailed 
P(XR) = probability of XR number of tank cars releasing per train trip on a route 
 
Train Characteristics 
Waybill data from the AAR TRAIN II database for ammonia and chlorine traffic in 2016 
were used to estimate train characteristics. Each waybill entry represents a loaded tank car 
shipment, of which there were 33,144 and 24,428 for ammonia and chlorine respectively in 
2016. Previous risk analyses used a car-mile based derailment rate and car-specific information 
from waybill data to obtain the risk of derailment of a single tank car (Saat, 2009). The MTCR 
model was developed to estimate the distribution of number of tank cars derailed and releasing 
and is thus more accurate when multiple cars in a train derail and release. Instead of relying 
solely on tank car-specific information, the MTCR model also incorporates the characteristics of 
a train. To obtain train-specific information, cars with the same origin and destination (O-D) pair 
on the same day were assumed to travel in the same trains. 
  
Tank cars with the same O-D pair in the same train are referred to collectively as a “cut” 
in this research. Using this approach, the frequency distribution of tank cars being placed in 
different cut sizes was developed (Figure 4.1). Chlorine travels in single tank cars about three 
times more often than ammonia, and ammonia most frequently travels in cut sizes of five.  
 
Other train-specific information was based on average values for Class I railroads (AAR, 
2015). For example, train length was assumed to be 76; and the average weight of all other cars, 
including both loaded and empty cars, was assumed to be 163,600 lbs. The weight of loaded 
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legacy tank cars was assumed to be 263,000 lbs., and 286,000 lbs. for I-Cars, based on the 
respective maximum gross rail load (GRL) permitted (FRA, 2011). In the analysis, trains were 
assumed to have three locomotives, each weighing 374,000 lbs., although this assumption has 




Figure 4.1: Frequency Distribution of Number of Ammonia and Chlorine Tank Cars Per Cut 
 
 
Route Characteristics  
For route characteristics, O-D pairs from traffic data were input into PC*Miler|Rail, a 
routing software, to generate the standard point location codes (SPLCs) of intermediate stations. 
SPLCs were then used to generate a route for each train in ArcGIS, which is a geographic 
information system that can perform spatial analysis. Rail line maps from the National 
Transportation Atlas Database (NTAD) (DOT, 2017), and US census data from Topologically 


























were loaded as layers, from which route characteristics including track segment ID, traffic, 
length, and population density near each track segment could be obtained. By mapping the track 
segment ID to the database provided by railroads, and supplementing it with data from system 
timetables, additional track characteristics such as FRA track class and method of operation 
(whether the territory is signaled or dark) were obtained for each segment ID. Information on 
track class, method of operation, and traffic was required to estimate the segment-specific 
derailment rate based on Liu et al.’s (2017) three-factor derailment model. 
 
Conditional Probability of Release (CPR) 
Different tank car specifications safety designs have different CPR values if they are 
derailed in an FRA-reportable mainline accident (ATCCRP, 2016). This paper focuses on 
comparison of the specifications for legacy tank cars and I-Cars for ammonia and chlorine (Table 
4.1). Switching to I-Cars for ammonia and chlorine substantially improves safety because the 
CPR is reduced by over 50% for both commodities. 
 
 



















112J340W 0.625 0.625 Full      119 0.033 
 112J500I 0.900 0.900 Full 116.75 0.016 52% 
        
Chlorine 
105J500W 0.812 0.775 No 100.45 0.042 




Combining train information, route information, and the CPR for the legacy tank car and 
I-Car specifications, the MTCR model produces estimates of the probability of derailment and 
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release on each track segment for a train. The population density along a buffer area adjacent to 
each rail line segment was calculated using ArcGIS. The size of this buffer was based on the size 
of the protective action zone (PAZ) for each chemical recommended by PHMSA’s Emergency 
Response Guidebook (ERG) (2016). The size of the PAZ is affected by the wind speed and 
whether a release occurs during the day or night. For purposes of this analysis, I assumed 
moderate wind speed and that accidents are equally likely to happen during the day or night. The 
width of ERG PAZ buffer was calculated to be 1.1 and 4.8 miles for ammonia and chlorine 
respectively, and the corresponding areas were 1.3 and 23.68 square miles, respectively. The 
Network Risk Analysis model estimates total population affected by summing the product of the 




Using this risk analysis method, the estimated risks associated with ammonia and 
chlorine traffic in 2016 were developed (Table 4.2). The tank car specification has a small effect 
on estimated number of derailments and the expected number of tank cars derailed. This is 
because the GRL of I-Cars is higher than that of legacy tank cars, and the current derailment 
frequency estimation method is based on ton miles. Consequently, the higher GRL for I-Cars 
results in a slightly higher rate per car. Offsetting this is that I-Cars have a larger capacity, which 
reduces the number of shipments and therefore exposure to derailments. The annual traffic was 
adjusted to account for the higher capacity of I-Cars. Comparing the capacity of randomly 
sampled I-Cars and legacy tank cars, the average capacity increase was about 1.4% for ammonia 



















Legacy 0.324 0.164 0.023   18 
I-Car 0.330 0.169 0.013   10 
      
Chlorine 
Legacy 0.366 0.133 0.032 476 
I-Car 0.353 0.129 0.014 211 
 
 
For the purpose of this study, I assumed that traffic remained constant during the study 
period. Another factor I considered was that in 2016, 15% of ammonia tank cars and 28% of 
chlorine tank cars were I-Cars, reflecting the attrition-based phase-in of cars constructed since 
the 2009 rulemaking. I assumed that the phase-in was linear, and that traffic was evenly 
distributed among different tank cars. For example, from 2009 to 2016, I-Cars replaced 28% of 
chlorine tank cars, so the attrition-based phase-in rate used for chlorine was 4% per year, which 
was the average rate over the 7-year period from 2009 to 2016. Based on these results and 
assumptions, I compared the risk of different implementation scenarios. 
 
Policy Scenarios in 2009 
The first objective of this chapter is to understand the risk of transporting TIH materials 
under various phase-in strategies of I-Cars. With the development of I-Car specifications in 2009, 
AAR proposed a 10-year phase-in of I-Cars (AAR, 2008), while PHMSA proposed an attrition-
based phase-in of I-Cars with the expectation that safer tank cars would be available shortly after 
2012. However, as discussed above, the ATCCRP research eventually made it apparent that a 
substantially safer design was impractical, so the actual effect of the rulemaking in 2009 was 




Figure 4.2: Phase-In Options in 2009 
 
I considered eight scenarios for the period 2009-2019 based on four different phase-in 
options and two different assumptions about the derailment rate. The four phase-in policy 
options considered were: continued use of legacy tank cars, a 10-year phase-in of I-Cars, the 
actual attrition-based phase-in rate observed in response to the regulation, and for comparison 
purposes, an immediate implementation of I-Cars in 2009. Regarding the derailment rate, two 
options were considered: a static derailment rate with no change since 2009, and the actual, 
declining Class I railroad derailment rate observed since 2009 (Liu, 2015). The estimated 
population affected was calculated for ammonia and chlorine for the four phase-in options with 
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Figure 4.3: Estimated Annual Population Affected by (a) Ammonia and (b) Chlorine  
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Figure 4.4: Estimated Annual Population Affected by (a) Ammonia and (b) Chlorine  
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Over the 11-year period, the cumulative expected risks were evaluated based on three 
metrics: the expected number of tank cars derailed, the expected number of releases, and the 
population affected (Table 4.3). The four different policy scenarios have minimal effect on the 
expected number of tank cars derailed because as previously discussed, the use of different tank 
car specifications has little effect on the derailment frequency. However, different tank car 
specifications substantially affect the probability of release, which is reflected in the difference in 
the expected number of releases and the corresponding population affected under the various 
policy scenarios. If all ammonia and chlorine traffic was transported in I-Cars from 2009 to 2016, 
the expected number of releases and the population affected would have been reduced by about 
46% for ammonia, and 56% for chlorine compared to continued use of legacy tank cars. A 10-
year phase-in of I-Cars would have reduced the risk metrics by about 20% for ammonia and 25% 
for chlorine. The linear attrition-based phase-in, which approximates the actual effect of the 
rulemaking in 2009, reduced the population affected about 5% and 10% for ammonia and 
chlorine respectively.   
 
The declining derailment rate had the effect of reducing the marginal benefit of 
implementing the I-Car. For example, if the derailment rate had remained static, the 10-year 
phase-in of ammonia I-Cars in 2009 would have resulted in a 23% reduction in risk, whereas the 
same comparison with the declining derailment rate would have been a 20% reduction. The 
combined effect of both the actual decline in derailment rate and the 10-year implementation of 






Table 4.3: Estimated Risks of Ammonia and Chlorine Traffic from 2009 to 2019 
 
 
Number of Tank Cars Derailed 
Derailment Rate  Product 
Legacy 







Ammonia  2.76   2.77   2.77   2.77  
Chlorine  2.25   2.18   2.23   2.21  
      
Decreasing 
Ammonia  2.07   2.08   2.08   2.08  
Chlorine  1.69   1.64   1.68   1.67  
 
 
Number of Releases 
Derailment Rate  Product 
Legacy 







Ammonia 0.403  0.217  0.383  0.310  
Chlorine 0.539  0.239  0.480  0.389  
      
Decreasing 
Ammonia 0.303  0.163  0.290  0.241  




Derailment Rate  Product 
Legacy 







Ammonia    305    164    290    235 
Chlorine 8,008 3,545 7,128 5,777 
      
Decreasing 
Ammonia    230    124    220    183 
Chlorine 6,018 2,664 5,437 4,544 
 
 
Policy Scenarios in 2012 
Another objective of this chapter is to ask how much safer a new tank car design 
produced by the ATCCRP in 2012 would have needed to be to compensate for the additional risk 
incurred due to delaying onset of a 10-year implementation of the I-Car immediately beginning 
in 2009. To address this question, the risk outcomes of the first two options in Figure 4.5 were 
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investigated. For this analysis a 50-year period was used based on the maximum life span of a 
tank car. The outcome of the third option in Figure 4.5 will be addressed in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Phase-In Options in 2012 
 
The green line (diamond symbol) in Figure 4.6 gives the cumulative expected population 
affected by ammonia traffic adjusted for decreasing derailment rate with a 10-year phase-in of I-
Cars beginning in 2012; the red line (triangle symbol) shows the same thing, except with a 
phase-in beginning in 2009. Because of the delayed implementation of I-Cars, the cumulative 
population affected shown by the green line will always be higher than the red line. By scaling 
the population affected to adjust for the effect of safer tank cars, it is possible to make the green 
line converge with the red line, which is denoted by the blue line (circle symbol). This means 
that to offset the increased risk from delaying the 10-year phase-in from 2009 to 2012, the newer 
tank car would need to be 15.7% safer than I-Cars to make the total expected population affected 
equal at the end of the study period. If the phase-in period in 2012 was shorter, such as five years, 





Figure 4.6: Estimated Cumulative Estimated Population Affected by Ammonia Traffic 
 
Table 4.4 summarizes the results addressing the question of how much safer the newer 
tank car needed to be to offset the risk due to delaying the implementation of I-Cars. The higher 
the percentage, the more robust the new tank cars need to be, which would likely lead to a higher 
cost and a reduced capacity if building them was feasible. As discussed earlier, with decreasing 
the derailment rate, deferring implementation of safer tank cars reduces the marginal benefit. 
Thus, the longer the implantation is deferred, the more difficult it is to equal the total safety. The 
newer tank cars for ammonia would need to be more than 15% safer with a decreasing 
derailment rate to justify deferring the 10-year phase-in from 2009 to 2012, as compared to about 
5% safer if the derailment rate had remained static. It is also possible to compensate for deferring 





















10-year phase-in of I-Cars in 2009
10-year phase-in of I-Cars in 2012
10-year phase-in of tank car 15.7% safer than I-Car in 2012
5-year phase-in of tank car 2.0% safer than I-Car in 2012
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phase-in in 2012, the newer tank car specifications are not required to be substantially safer than 
I-Cars for the total population affected to be the same as a 10-year phase-in in 2009.  
 
Table 4.4: Safer Tank Car Required to Offset the Effect of Delaying Implementation of I-Cars 
 
Derailment Rate Product 10-Year Phase-In 5-Year Phase-In 
Static Ammonia   5.2%  0.3% 
Chlorine   6.6% -0.1% 
    
Decreasing 
 
Ammonia 15.7%  2.0% 
Chlorine 19.7%  0.4% 
 
 
Policy Scenarios in 2019 
Following PHMSA’s acceptance of the petition submitted by the ATCCRP in 2017, the 
industry is awaiting the new rulemaking on the phase-in policy. There are two principal 
proposals being considered, a 6-year phase-in and an 18-year phase-in. The method described in 
the preceding sections was applied to evaluate these alternatives in terms of future risk. The 
population affected was estimated under these two policy scenarios as well as the current 










Figure 4.7: Estimated Cumulative Population Affected by (a) Ammonia and (b) Chlorine  


























































Figure 4.8: Estimated Cumulative Population Affected by (a) Ammonia and (b) Chlorine  

















































The 18-year phase-in rate is actually slightly slower than the current attrition-based 
phase-in rate for chlorine, which is the reason that the total population affected is higher with an 
18-year phase-in (Table 4.5). Based on this estimation, the 18-year phase-in will reduce the 
population affected by ammonia traffic by about 10% and will not decrease the population 
affected by chlorine. A 6-year phase-in, on the other hand, will reduce the population affected by 
ammonia and chlorine traffic by about 20% and 14% respectively compared to having an 
attrition-based phase-in. 
 
Table 4.5: Estimated Population Affected Under Varying Policy Scenarios in 2019 




(Population Affected,  
Percent Reduced) 
18-Year Phase-In 
(Population Affected,  
Percent Reduced) 
Static 
Ammonia    430 319 26% 380 12% 
Chlorine 8,136 6,984 14% 8,458 -4% 
       
Decreasing 
Ammonia 146 112 23% 133 9% 
Chlorine 2,876 2,462 14% 2,968 -3% 
 
 
Conclusion and Future Work 
This research evaluates the safety benefit of implementing safer tank cars under varying 
policy scenarios by integrating data from several sources and performing a spatial analysis using 
GIS. The results provide a quantitative approach to understand the effect of several policy 
questions related to implementation of more damage-resistant tank cars for transportation of TIH 
materials.  
 
The results show that I-Cars reduce population affected by about 50%. A 10-year phase-
in of I-Cars in 2009 would have reduced population affected by about 20% compared to 
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continuing using legacy tank cars, while the attrition-based phase-in that actually occurred 
reduced risk by about 5% and 10% for ammonia and chlorine respectively. In addition, by 
deferring implementation of safer tank cars, the marginal benefit is reduced due to the overall 
reduction in derailment rate. This is the reason that with decreasing derailment rate, a ten-year 
phase-in in 2012 would require substantially safer tank car specifications (over 15% safer than I-
Car) to compensate for the risk that could have been reduced by delaying onset of a 10-year 
implementation of the I-Car immediately beginning in 2009, as compared to about 6% safer with 
static derailment rate.  
 
 In conducting this research, I made several assumptions to enable development of the 
estimates presented here. The effect of these assumptions could be further refined in future 
research. For example, this research only considered mainline derailments, the effect of yard, 
sidings and industry trackage could be considered in future work. The effect of collisions could 
also be incorporated into these risk analyses. The MTCR model also assumes that tank cars are 
randomly positioned in the train. However, tank cars in a cut may often travel together in trains 
between origin and destination. Thus, the in-train placement of tank cars could be modeled more 
realistically. This research also assumed a linear phase-in of I-Cars, but this could be refined 
using information on the actual demographics of the tank car fleet. Using the year built and 
average life span of tank cars, the percentage of tank cars replaced each year could be more 
accurately estimated. The top two TIH commodities, ammonia and chlorine, were evaluated 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In previous chapters, I focused on derailments and releases of hazardous materials, 
specifically discussing three topics related to this general theme: unit train loading condition, the 
effect of train configuration on risk and the safety benefit of implementation schedule for safer 
tank cars. In this chapter, I summarize the principal results, discuss some of the practical 
applications and implications for risk mitigation strategies and possible future research needs.  
 
In Chapter 2, I found that loaded and empty unit train derailments have differences in 
derailment frequency, severity and causes. There were five times more loaded unit train 
derailments than empty unit train derailments recorded in the FRA REA database. Relevant 
traffic data are needed to determine whether there is a different derailment rate for the two 
loading conditions. The comparison of severity showed that loaded unit trains derailed 
significantly more cars than empty unit trains. Part of the difference in frequency and severity 
might be explained by the derailment causal analysis that found different distributions of causes 
for the two loading conditions. Three out of the top ten most frequent derailment causes for the 
two loading conditions were the same, suggesting that reducing the incidence of these causes 
will improve safety irrespective of the train loading condition. For example, broken rails or 
welds were the most frequent cause for loaded unit trains and the second most frequent cause for 
empty unit trains, and this cause often led to severe accidents in both loading conditions. 
Mitigation strategies targeting this cause will likely be more cost-effective because these types of 
accidents are both frequent and severe. The most frequent and severe causes of empty unit train 
derailments were extreme weather conditions such as tornadoes and extreme wind velocity. 
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Since empty trains are particularly susceptible to these types of accident, modification of 
operating practices for these trains when severe weather threatens may be of particular 
importance in managing risk.  
 
In Chapter 3, I compared the risk associated with transporting the same volume of 
hazardous material traffic annually in a smaller number of unit trains, or distributed in a larger 
number of manifest trains. On a per trip basis, unit trains have higher average risk because there 
are more tank cars with hazardous materials per consist. For annual risk, more manifest trains are 
required to transport the same number of tank cars, which increases their exposure to derailments, 
resulting in relatively smaller, but more frequent derailments and releases. By contrast, fewer 
unit trains are needed, and the risk for these trains conforms to a low frequency, high 
consequence risk profile. I used three metrics to assess safety and risk, number of tank cars 
derailed, number of tank cars releasing, and quantity released. The annual expected value and 
variance for these risk metrics are higher for unit trains than manifest trains. As expected, DOT 
117 tank cars derailed at about the same rate as DOT 111 tank cars, but they substantially reduce 
the probability of release and expected quantity released in all scenarios. Further refinement of 
this research would involve analysis of different tank car positions in trains. For example, tank 
cars from the same origin to the same destination in a manifest train may tend to be positioned 
together, whereas in my analysis the model assumed random and independent placement of tank 
cars in the train. The effect of different routes for unit versus manifest trains could also be 
investigated. In this study, I assumed that both train types used the same route, but in actuality 
unit trains might use more direct routes than manifest trains. Cars traveling in manifest trains 
also spend more time in classification yards where they experience additional handling and 
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consequent exposure to additional accident risk. The methodology presented in this chapter 
could be adapted to evaluate risk for particular routes and train configurations. 
 
In Chapter 4, I presented an approach to quantify the safety benefit of implementing safer 
tank cars under several different replacement schedules based on the proposals considered by 
railroads, chemical shippers, tank car companies, and government. The approach integrated 
traffic and routing data, spatial information and used the MTCR model. This approach improves 
upon previous work because it accounts for the number of cars in a train rather than simply 
relying on individual tank car derailment rate and release probability. In this research I also 
considered two derailment rate scenarios, one in which derailment rate remained static, and the 
other reflecting the declining derailment rate. In all scenarios I found that implementing safer 
tank cars sooner reduced risk, because with decreasing derailment rate, the marginal benefit of 
the safer tank cars declined as time progressed. 
 
This research can provide insight to ongoing and future consideration of different policy 
options for phase-in of safer tank cars. Further research on this topic might consider the role of 
collisions, and accidents on other track types, such as sidings and yard tracks. Here again, in-
train tank car placement could be modeled more realistically to account for tank cars in a cut. 
Another avenue for further research would be to use the actual demographics of the tank car fleet 
to estimate replacement period, rather than simply assuming a linear phase-in, as was done in 
this study. Future work could also evaluate other TIH commodities, the effect of differing 
amounts of traffic, and alternative routing.  
  
